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Abstract
We consider a successive Cournot oligopoly with competition between vertically integrated
and unintegrated ﬁrms. Furthermore, we consider the case where it is possible to introduce
corporate social responsibility (CSR) into ﬁrms’ objectives: the ﬁrms could be non-proﬁt
maximizers. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst-best allocation can be achieved using a uniform per-unit
subsidy regardless of ﬁrm distribution and the weight of CSR in the ﬁrms’ objectives.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L13, L22, L50
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??Introduction
Whether vertical integration impedes competition and worsens social welfare is a major
topic in the ﬁeld of industrial organization. Studies propose contrasting approaches to explore
the impact of vertical integration. Greenhut and Ohta (1979) and Salinger (1988) pioneered
the ﬁeld using the successive oligopolies framework1?. These studies indicate that the impact
of vertical integration on social welfare depends on the distribution of integrated and uninte-
grated ﬁrms; in this case, a subsidy policy could be eﬀective because oligopolies will continue
in the ﬁnal goods market even if vertical integration improves social welfare. As one objec-
tive, this study aims to provide a theoretically distribution of how a uniform subsidization
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1?There are also other types of studies. Ordover et al. (1990) and Chen (2001) use a diﬀerent
model to examine the endogenous decision related to vertical integration besides the aforemen-
tioned topic. Of course, there are studies that examine the endogenous decision in the successive
Cournot oligopoly framework. See, for example, Abiru et al. (1998) and Buehler and Schmutzler
(2008).
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policy works in a successive oligopoly wherein vertically integrated and unintegrated ﬁrms
compete. If the ﬁrst-best allocation is possible regardless of ﬁrm distribution, we can ignore
the aforementioned problem by using the subsidy policy.
In 2009, the Japanese government decided to introduce a subsidy for consumers and for-
warding agencies who buy new cars that satisfy certain fuel eﬃciency and emission standards—
for example, “eco-cars” such as electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell
vehicles. In the eco-car industry, some intermediate goods producers often function sepa-
rately from the ﬁnal goods producers, whereas some are integrated with ﬁnal goods producers
because they have developed products with high technical capabilities, such as for certain
consumer electronics goods like laptops and cell phones2?. This case can serve as an example
for our study.
A check of the websites of the ﬁrms in the eco-car industry shows that most often empha-
size CSR, which includes various activities that do not directly increase proﬁts, for example,
regional contribution volunteer activities such as clean-up activities, reconstruction assistance,
implementing the traﬃc safety program, assistance for the arts and education for children,
and so on. Considering these activities, ﬁrms clearly do not always act as proﬁt maximizers.
Therefore, our model allows an analysis of cases where ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers and where
they are non-proﬁt maximizers. Matsumura and Ogawa (2014) introduce CSR into ﬁrms’
objectives assuming that ﬁrms maximize the weighted sum of total social surplus and proﬁt,
a setting we adopt. This study’s other aim is to investigate how the weight of CSR in each
ﬁrm’s objectives aﬀect the equilibrium subsidy level.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Sections 3 derives the
conditions to realize the ﬁrst-best allocation, and section 4 considers a non-linear demand
function and shows that it is possible to realize the ﬁrst-best allocation under certain con-
ditions using a uniform per-unit subsidy. Section 5 considers a linear demand function and
shows that the aforementioned condition also holds in this case. In addition, we show the
results of some comparative statics associated with the weight on CSR. Section 6 concludes
the main text.
2?Regarding battery production, Panasonic and Toyota set up a joint venture, “Panasonic EV Energy
Co., Ltd,” while NEC Group and Nissan established “Automotive Energy Supply Corporation”;
Toshiba supplies a rechargeable battery, “SCiB,” to the market—for example, to Mitsubishi and
Honda.
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??The model
Our model is based on Salinger’s (1988) model. We assume that there areM ≥ 2 upstream
ﬁrms producing homogeneous intermediate goods and N ≥ 2 downstream ﬁrms producing ho-
mogeneous ﬁnal goods. Furthermore, pairs of one upstream ﬁrm and one downstream ﬁrm
may have vertically integrated to form a third type, resulting in three types of ﬁrms: unin-
tegrated upstream ﬁrms (U ﬁrm), unintegrated downstream ﬁrms (D ﬁrm), and vertically
integrated ﬁrms (V ﬁrm). The number of V ﬁrms is n such that 1 ≤ n ≤ min{M − 1, N − 1}.
The proﬁt of U ﬁrm k can be given by
πUk = (w − c)xk, k = 1, · · · ,M − n, (1)
where w denotes the price of the intermediate good, xk the output of U ﬁrm k, c the marginal
production cost, and c > 0.
Each D ﬁrm uses one intermediate good to produce one ﬁnal good. D ’s proﬁt is given by
ΠDj = (p− w)qj , j = n+ 1, · · · , N, (2)
where p denotes the price of the ﬁnal good and qj the output of D ﬁrm j. Here, the gov-
ernment grants the representative consumer a purchasing subsidy per unit of ﬁnal good. The
inverse demand function is given by p = P (Q) + s, where Q denotes the total output of ﬁnal
goods and s denotes the per-unit subsidy level. P (Q) has the following properties: there
exists γ ∈ (0,∞) such that P (Q) > 0 for Q ∈ [0, γ) and P (Q) = 0 for Q ∈ [γ,∞). P (Q) is
twice-continuously diﬀerentiable and P ′(Q) < 0 for all Q on [0, γ), and P (0) > c.
For V ﬁrms, proﬁt is the joint proﬁt of U ﬁrm and D ﬁrm; that is,
ΠVi = (p− c)qi, i = 1, · · · , n, (3)
where qi denotes the output of V ﬁrm i. We assume no adjustment costs for ﬁrms’ vertical
integration and that V ﬁrms do not participate in the intermediate goods market.
Social welfare can now be given by:
W =
(∫ Q
0
P (t)dt− (p− s)Q
)
+
⎛
⎝ n∑
i=1
ΠVi +
N∑
j=n+1
ΠDj +
M−n∑
k=1
πUk
⎞
⎠− sQ. (4)
The ﬁrst curly bracket represents consumer surplus, the second curly bracket represents pro-
ducer surplus, and the remaining part of W represents the government’s total subsidy pay-
ment.
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With respect to each ﬁrm’s objective, we follow the setting provided by Matsumura and
Ogawa (2014). Each V and D ﬁrm aims to maximize the weighted sum of social welfare and
its proﬁt:
UVi = (1− θV )ΠVi + θVW, i = 1, · · · , n, (5)
UDj = (1− θD)ΠDj + θDW, j = n+ 1, · · · , N, (6)
where θV , θD ∈ [0, 1) and are exogenously given. On the other hand, each U ﬁrm aims to
maximize its proﬁt. We use this setting without CSR because it is too complex for analysis.
This is a three-stage game. First, the government chooses the subsidy level. Second, U
ﬁrms choose their output levels and then determine the price of their intermediate goods.
Finally, D and V ﬁrms choose their output levels simultaneously.
We analyze this case in a partial equilibrium framework and focus on a symmetric equi-
librium for each type of ﬁrm.
??First-best allocation
We now consider the ﬁrst-best allocation. Under the eﬃcient production of intermediate
goods, we transform W into
W =
∫ Q
0
P (t)dt− cQ. (7)
The ﬁrst-order welfare maximizing condition is
dW
dQ
= P (QFB)− c = 0, (8)
where QFB denotes the ﬁrst-best total output of ﬁnal goods. From this result, we ﬁnd no
unique ﬁrst-best allocation, that is, all allocations that satisfy QFB =
∑
i qi +
∑
j qj can be
the ﬁrst-best allocation.
??The equilibrium outcome and main results
We now solve the three-stage game using backward induction. First, we consider the third
stage, where we assume that the marginal revenue of each ﬁrm decreases with the increase in
its rivals’ output: P ′(Z+q)+P ′′(Z+q)q < 0 for all non-negative Z and q with Z+q ∈ [0, γ).
The assumptions mentioned earlier combined with this condition guarantee a unique Nash
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equilibrium in the third stage3?.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problems for V ﬁrm i and D ﬁrm j are as
follows:
∂UVi
∂qi
= P (Q)− c+ (1− θV )(P ′(Q)qi + s) = 0, i = 1, · · · , n, (9)
∂UDj
∂qj
= P (Q)− w + (1− θD)(P ′(Q)qj + s) = 0, j = n+ 1, · · · , N. (10)
From the above n number of ﬁrst-order conditions for V ﬁrms and N−n number of ﬁrst-order
conditions for D ﬁrms, we obtain the following equilibrium output in the third stage:
qsbi = q
V (w, s; c, θV , θD, n,N), i = 1, · · · , n, (11)
qsbj = q
D(w, s; c, θV , θD, n,N), j = n+ 1, · · · , N, (12)
Qsb = Qsb(w, s; c, θV , θD, n,N), (13)
where the superscript sb denotes the equilibrium outcome in the third stage.
Next, we consider the second stage. From the market clearing condition for intermediate
goods
∑
j q
sb
j = X, where X represents
∑
k xk, we obtain the inverse demand function for
intermediate good wsb = wsb(X, s; c, θV , θD, n,N). Now, the proﬁt of U ﬁrm k becomes
πUsbk = (w
sb − c)xk, k = 1, · · · ,M − n. (14)
Here, we assume that the second-order proﬁt-maximizing condition for each U ﬁrm is satisﬁed.
The ﬁrst-order proﬁt-maximizing condition for U ﬁrm k is
∂πUsbk
∂xk
= wsb − c+ ∂w
sb
∂X
xk = 0, k = 1, · · · ,M − n. (15)
From the above M − n number of ﬁrst-order conditions for U ﬁrms, we obtain the following
equilibrium output in the second stage:
xSBk = x
SB(s; c, θV , θD, n,M,N), k = 1, · · · ,M − n, (16)
where the superscript SB denotes the equilibrium outcome in the second stage. We denote
QSB as Qsb(wsb(XSB , s; c, θV , θD, n,N), s; c, θV , θD, n,N), where XSB =
∑
k x
SB
k .
Last, we consider the ﬁrst stage. The government maximizes social welfare by choosing the
appropriate subsidy level. From the balance of revenue and expenditures for the intermediate
goods, we rewrite social welfare as
3? See Gaudet and Salant (1991).
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WSB =
∫ QSB
0
P (t)dt− cQSB . (17)
Here, we assume that the second-order welfare-maximizing condition is satisﬁed. The ﬁrst-
order welfare-maximizing condition is given by
∂WSB
∂s
=
(
P (QSB)− c) ∂QSB
∂s
= 0. (18)
Now, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a successive Cournot oligopoly where vertically integrated
and unintegrated ﬁrms with CSR compete. If ∂QSB/∂s = 0, the ﬁrst-best allocation can be
achieved by using a uniform per-unit subsidy regardless of ﬁrm distribution and the weight of
CSR in ﬁrms’ objectives.
Proof When ∂QSB/∂s = 0, the government always chooses a subsidy level that satisﬁes
P (QSB)− c = 0 from (18) identical to (8).
In the next section, we consider the case with a linear inverse demand function and ﬁnd
that ∂QSB/∂s > 0 in this case.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. From the social welfare perspective, the
total output of ﬁnal goods and production allocation are important. However, production
allocation is not important in this case because D ﬁrms’ production cost is perfectly oﬀset
by U ﬁrms’ revenue and the marginal cost of producing an intermediate good is identical for
U and V ﬁrms. Only the total output of ﬁnal goods aﬀects social welfare, and therefore the
ﬁrst-best allocation can be achieved with a uniform subsidy.
??Linear demand function
In this section, we show that proposition 1 holds when the inverse demand function is
linear: P (Q) = a−Q. In the third stage, we solve the maximization problems for each V and
D ﬁrm, where the sum of their ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
n{a+ (1− θV )s− c} − (n+ 1− θV )QV − nQD = 0, (19)
(N − n){a+ (1− θD)s− w} − (N − n)QV − (N − n+ 1− θD)QD = 0, (20)
where QV ≡ ∑i qi and QD ≡ ∑j qj . To solve the above equations with respect to QV and
QD, we obtain the following equilibrium total output for V and D ﬁrms in the third stage.
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QV sb =
n
Δ
[(1− θD)a− (1− θD +N − n)c+ (N − n)w + {(1− θD)(1− θV )
+(N − n)(θD − θV )}s], (21)
QDsb =
N − n
Δ
[(1− θV )a+ nc− (n+ 1− θV )w + {(1− θD)(1− θV )
−n(θD − θV )}s], (22)
where Δ = (1− θD)(1− θV ) +N − nθD − (N − n)θV > 0.
In the second stage, the price of an intermediate good is determined so as to satisfy
QDsb = X, and we obtain
wsb =
(N − n)[(1− θV )a+ nc+ {(1− θD)(1− θV )− n(θD − θV )}s] + ΔX
(N − n)(n+ 1− θV ) . (23)
Using the above inverse demand function of the intermediate good, we solve the maximization
problem for U ﬁrms; the sum of their ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
(M − n)(an− cn− aN + cN + ns−Ns− nsθD − n2sθD +NsθD + nNsθD − anθV
+cnθV + aNθV − cNθV − nsθV + n2sθV +NsθV − nNsθV + nsθDθV −NsθDθV )
+(M − n+ 1)ΔX = 0. (24)
To solve the above equation with respect to X and to derive xSB = XSB/(M −n), we obtain
xSB =
(N − n)[(a− c)(1− θV ) + s{(1− θD)(1− θV )− n(θD − θV )}]
(M − n+ 1)Δ . (25)
The equilibrium total output QSB in the second stage is:
QSB =
1
(M − n+ 1)(n+ 1− θV )Δ{(a− c)(n+MN +MnN − n
2N − nθD
−MnθD −Mn2θD + n3θD − nθV +MnθV +Mn2θV − n3θV − 2MNθV
+nNθV −MnNθV + n2NθV + nθDθV +MnθDθV − n2θDθV −Mn(θV )2
+n2(θV )2 +MN(θV )2 − nN(θV )2 + (1− θV )Δ∗s}, (26)
where Δ∗ = n+MN +MnN − n2N − nθD − n2θD −MNθD + nNθD −MnNθD + n2NθD
− nθV + n2θV −MNθV + nθDθV +MNθDθV − nNθDθV > 0. We ﬁnd that ∂QSB/∂s > 0.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government maximizes social welfare in terms of s. To solve the
ﬁrst-order condition, we obtain
s∗ =
(a− c){(M − n+ 1)(1− θD)(n+ 1− θV ) + (N − n)(1− θV )}
Δ∗
. (27)
We then obtain the equilibrium outcome in the full game and show some results below.
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W ∗ =
(a− c)2
2
, (28)
Q∗ = a− c, (29)
QD∗ =
(a− c)(M − n)(N − n)(1− θD)(1 + n− θV )
Δ∗
, (30)
QV ∗ = ns∗, (31)
x∗ =
(a− c)(N − n)(1− θD)(1 + n− θV )
Δ∗
, (32)
where the asterisk indicates the equilibrium outcome in the full game. We ﬁnd the maximum
social welfare, or the ﬁrst-best allocation, a uniform per-unit subsidy.
Here, we examine how the weight of CSR in each ﬁrm’s objectives aﬀect the equilibrium
subsidy level, V and D ﬁrms’ total output, and obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the weight of CSR in the objective of vertically integrated ﬁrm θV
(unintegrated downstream ﬁrm θD) increases: 1. the equilibrium subsidy level s∗ decreases
(increases), 2. the total output of vertically integrated ﬁrm QV decreases (increases), and 3.
the total output of unintegrated downstream ﬁrm QD increases (decreases).
Proof The following summarizes the comparative statics.
∂s∗
∂θV
= − (a− c)n(M − n)(N − n)
2(1− θD)
(Δ∗)2
< 0, (33)
∂QV ∗
∂θV
= − (a− c)n
2(M − n)(N − n)2(1− θD)
(Δ∗)2
< 0, (34)
∂QD∗
∂θV
=
(a− c)n2(M − n)(N − n)2(1− θD)
(Δ∗)2
> 0, (35)
∂s∗
∂θD
=
(a− c)(M − n)(N − n)2(1 + n− θV )(1− θV )
(Δ∗)2
> 0, (36)
∂QV ∗
∂θD
=
(a− c)n(M − n)(N − n)2(1 + n− θV )(1− θV )
(Δ∗)2
> 0, (37)
∂QD∗
∂θD
= − (a− c)n(M − n)(N − n)
2(1 + n− θV )(1− θV )
(Δ∗)2
< 0, (38)
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is diﬃcult to explain. For example, we pick up the
case of ∂s∗/∂θV < 0 and ∂s∗/∂θD > 0. To see their results, we consider the following in-
tuition — when θV increases, the total output of a vertically integrated ﬁrm increases as V
ﬁrms produce more to enhance welfare. Their marginal costs are less than those of D ﬁrms,
and the total output increases signiﬁcantly. Therefore, the case requires a lower subsidy. The
opposite results hold when θD increases; however, this is not correct. From (9), an increase in
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θV leads to both a decrease in market power but also a decrease in the subsidy’s importance
in the V ﬁrm’s objectives. The former implies that V ﬁrms produce more, while the latter
implies that it produces less. Therefore, whether θV increases the total output of a vertically
integrated ﬁrm or not depends on the magnitude of the relationships between the above two
eﬀects. Unfortunately, this is not yet clear. At this point, we will continue with a deeper anal-
ysis using other settings to obtain the correct intuition behind the results. It is interesting
that an increase in the weight θV (θD) decreases the total output of V (D) ﬁrms QV ∗ (QD∗);
where there is no subsidy, V (D) ﬁrms produce more with an increase in θV (θD), and thus
QV ∗ (QD∗) increases as long as the output is positive in the equilibrium. The results would
be counterintuitive.
The case where θV = θD = 0: All ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers
Here we consider the special case where θV = θD = 0, that is, all ﬁrms are proﬁt maxi-
mizer, as in a traditional case. In this case, for some equilibrium outcome, we show that
qsbi =
a− (N − n+ 1)c+ s+ (N − n)w
N + 1
, qsbj =
a+ nc+ s− (n+ 1)w
N + 1
,
Qsb =
(a+ s)N − (N − n)w − nc
N + 1
, wsb =
(a+ s)(N − n) + cn(N − n)− (N + 1)X
(n+ 1)(N − n) ,
XSB =
(M − n)(N − n)(a− c+ s)
(M − n+ 1)(N + 1) , Q
SB =
(a− c+ s){n+MN + (M − n)nN}
(n+ 1)(M − n+ 1)(N + 1) .
From the above results, we ﬁnd that ∂QSB/∂s > 0.
Note that the equilibrium subsidy level s∗ is
s∗ =
(1 + nM +M +N − n− n2)(a− c)
n+MN + nMN − n2N
and that it has the following properties: 1. ∂s∗/∂N < 0 and ∂s∗/∂M < 0, and 2. the sign of
∂s∗/∂n corresponds to the sign of 2nN − n2 −M −MN − 1. For property 1, an increase in
N or M leads to an increase in QSB because it becomes more competitive in the ﬁnal goods
market and therefore the case requires a lower subsidy. Property 2 has the same condition
that determines the sign of dPF /dn in Salinger (1988), where PF is almost the same as P (Q)
in this study, because the subsidy needed is lower (higher) than that needed when an increase
in n leads to an increase (decrease) in QSB ; that is, a decrease (increase) in P (Q).
??Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the eﬀect of a uniform per-unit subsidy in a successive Cournot
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oligopoly with competition between vertically integrated and unintegrated downstream ﬁrms
with CSR. We show that the ﬁrst-best allocation can be realized with a uniform subsidy,
even when the two types of ﬁrms have diﬀerent objective functions and marginal costs for
ﬁnal goods in the downstream market: the weight of CSR in vertically integrated ﬁrm θV
could diﬀer from that of unintegrated downstream ﬁrm θD, and the marginal cost of vertically
integrated ﬁrm c could be smaller than that of unintegrated downstream ﬁrm w.
We note that proposition 1 holds even when introducing a new stage where ﬁrms can
decide whether to integrate into the model. Therefore, we can ignore ﬁrms’ incentives for
vertical integration under a subsidization policy in terms of social welfare. However, note
that this depends on two assumptions: both vertically integrated ﬁrms and unintegrated
upstream ﬁrms have identical constant marginal costs of the intermediate good and ﬁrms
produce homogeneous goods in each market.
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